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Abstract 
Smart contracts, self-executing agreements based on blockchain technology, are a hotly debated topic 
in the tech community, among policy makers, industry stakeholders and in academia. They offer the 
prospect of cheaper, faster and better transactions. The hype around smart contracts is also viewed with 
caution. We contribute to the existing academic literature by addressing some of the concerns about the 
legal nature, anonymity and reliability of smart contracts. 
Several contract law scholars argue that smart contracts cannot offer a superior solution to many 
problems addressed by traditional contract law, such as contract validity and legality. Furthermore, they 
argue that smart contracts cannot replicate the relational context which is essential for the day-to-day 
practice of contracting. 
In this contribution, we firstly draw a distinction between smart contracts based on public blockchains 
and those based on private or permissioned blockchains. While all existing contributions develop their 
arguments implicitly assuming that smart contracts are based on public blockchains, much commercial 
experimentation with smart contracts is occurring on permissioned blockchains. Importantly, many of 
the mentioned problems do not arise on permissioned blockchains.  
Secondly, we argue that there is a good reason to prefer public blockchains over permissioned 
blockchains for contracting, namely their capacity to create trust in otherwise no-trust contracting 
environments. This is the path to unleash the full potential of smart contracts. In contrast to critics, we 
argue that compared to traditional contract law, smart contracts potentially offer a superior solution for 
facilitating trade.  
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1. Introduction 
New technologies are changing how we understand law and operate in a legal system. Most of the 
disruption in law comes from other business sectors – computer engineers or business people who use 
legal services and want to change the industry. One track in these changes belongs to the opportunities 
created by distributed computing. In this paper, we discuss how one of such applications of distributed 
computing - smart contracts - could provide a possible alternative mechanism for ensuring cooperation 
in transactions between two or more parties. 
Smart contracts, self-executing digital transactions using decentralized cryptographic mechanisms for 
enforcement,1 are a hotly debated topic in the tech community, among policy makers, industry 
stakeholders and in academia, because they offer the prospect of cheaper, faster and better transactions. 
The term 'smart contract' was coined by Nick Szabo, a US computer scientist and legal scholar. 
According to his definition a smart contract is 'a set of promises, specified in digital form, including 
protocols within which the parties perform on these promises'.2  
While there are several debates about its nature, today a smart contract is mostly understood as an 
agreement that is encoded in computer code and placed on a decentralized virtual infrastructure which 
has become known as the blockchain (in short, a self-executing agreement based on blockchain 
technology). Computer protocols are there to verify and enforce the clauses and performance of a 
contract thus making some traditional contractual activities involved in the verification and enforcement 
of a contract unnecessary. The technology allows automatically implementing and enforcing the terms 
of an agreement. While smart contracts can represent the translation of a specific contractual agreement 
with legal force between two parties, they can also create relationships without underlying contractual 
rights and obligations. 
The technology also makes it possible for parties to preserve their anonymity while contracting with 
each other. Until recently, complete anonymity between parties would provide for the paradigm set of 
circumstances where we would imagine needing contract law. This is because due to the anonymity the 
contract was not embedded in any social context that could work as an alternative enforcement 
mechanism to ensure that all parties cooperate.3 Yet, smart contracts seem to be able to function in 
precisely such contracting environments where parties could meet in complete anonymity. We claim 
that this feature sets smart contracts apart as new modes of contracting governance and as 
vehicles for contracting in no-trust environments.  
The paper is not focused on discussing external mechanisms to regulate smart contracts. In fact, we do 
not claim that smart contracts cannot be regulated by contract law or social norms - they can. What we 
claim instead is that they are a tool which facilitates contracting in no-trust environments where due to 
the complete anonymity between parties one would need contract law or other enforcement mechanisms 
as tools for contracting governance, but those are not available or reliable for various reasons. For 
example, in case of anonymity, even if there is contract law, we do not know the identities of the parties 
to the contract. A potential plaintiff would thus not be able to find the defendant. This deters from 
contracting until a suitable and reliable contract enforcement mechanism is provided. Such a mechanism 
can be more efficient in settings where contracting is governed by formal contract law and possibly even 
                                                     
1  We use the definition of Kevin Werbach and Nicolas Cornell. See Werbach K, Cornell N. Contracts Ex Machina. Duke Law 
Journal; Forthcoming. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2936294 (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
2  Szabo N. Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, Extropy 1996; 16 http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl 
/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.htm
l (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
3  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva H, Schmidt-Kessen MJ. Session 10: Smart Contracts, Course on the Law and Economics of Contracts at 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro. 2017 
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more so where it is not. Our focus is on explaining how smart contracts can provide such an alternative 
mechanism of contracting governance and analyzing the safeguards needed for implementing them - 
identification and regulation through code. 
Our further hypothesis is that in terms of both regulatory and economic implications it might be 
helpful to draw a distinction between smart contracts based on public blockchains and smart contracts 
based on permissioned blockchains. The design of the underlying blockchain technology is a significant 
feature that needs to be factored into the discussion on smart contracts. This is a point generally 
overlooked by most  legal academic literature. 
2. Public and permissioned blockchains underlying smart contracts 
2.1. Nature of transactions and registration on public blockchains 
Blockchain technology, the technology underlying smart contracts, is one of the distributed ledger 
technologies (aka decentralized public ledger, trustless public ledger, shared ledger technologies). This 
technology is not a leap in technological progress. Distributed computing as in peer-to-peer networks, 
the use of cryptographic keys, distributed data storage and consensus mechanisms had all been invented 
and put to use by the late 1990s.4 Nonetheless, blockchain technology helps to resolve the problem of 
how coordination of individuals’ activity could be ensured without a central authority guaranteeing the 
validity of transactions, and as such it is currently causing a disruption in many business sectors, 
including law.5 
A distributed ledger is a consensus of replicated, shared, and synchronized digital data geographically 
spread across multiple sites, countries, or institutions.6 There is no central administrator or central data 
storage.7 All distributed ledgers do not have to necessarily employ a chain of blocks to successfully 
provide secure and valid achievement of distributed consensus.8 Blockchain technology is different from 
other familiar distributed computing technologies like torrents. Both are based on P2P technology for 
spreading information across nodes and neither of them uses a central server. However, while torrents 
are all about copying information, blockchains are about preventing copying while rather guaranteeing 
the integrity of information. While the bitcoin blockchain, which uses proof-of-work mining, is the most 
publicly proven method used to achieve distributed consensus, there are many other forms of distributed 
ledger consensus processes implemented in private blockchain projects such as Ripple, Hyperledger or 
MultiChain.9 
In terms of technology, smart contracts are essentially pieces of code inside the blocks on the blockchain, 
which are available in all the nodes. But what does that mean? Let us get a high-level overview of the 
blockchain architecture in order to move on to other questions and use the example of bitcoin to see how 
                                                     
4  Wright A, De Filippi P. Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia. Social Science Research 
Network 2015 http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (July 11 2017, date last accessed) 4-5 
5  Wright A, De Filippi P. Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia. Social Science Research 
Network 2015 http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (July 11 2017, date last accessed) 5 
6  UK Government. Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Block Chain. A Report by the UK Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser. Crown Copyright 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492 
972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf (July 11 2017, date last accessed) 
7  Scardovi C. Restructuring and Innovation in Banking. Springer, 2016 https://play.google.com/store/books/ 
details?id=uNM0DQAAQBAJ (5 June 2017, date last accessed) 36 
8  Blockchain Technologies. Blockchain Technology Explained. http://www.blockchaintechnologies.com/blockchain-definition 
(5 June 2017, date last accessed) 
9  Blockchain Technologies. Blockchain Technology Explained. http://www.blockchaintechnologies.com/blockchain-definition 
(5 June 2017, date last accessed) 
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the transfer of control and registration in the database take place on a blockchain. We will assume a case 
of a bitcoin purchase and sale transaction. 
Bitcoin is fundamentally different both from physical cash, as well as traditional virtual currency such 
as money on a bank account. In bitcoin, there is neither a central authority maintaining a central database 
of who owns what (money), nor are there any physical objects (like physical coins or money bills) whose 
ownership characterises the ownership of the bitcoins. Instead, there is a public ledger (inside the so-
called blockchain) that contains a list of all transactions that ever occurred between any two bitcoin 
'accounts'. Notice that no central authority is in place. The rules of the bitcoin system (e.g. who can 
transfer bitcoins to whom, etc.) are established by consensus and coded into the software that runs the 
bitcoin system. Aspects of the bitcoin system can be changed if a sufficiently large portion of the devices 
in the bitcoin network implement that change.10 
In order to buy, receive or use bitcoins one must create one or many bitcoin addresses using the 
downloaded software or an online site. A bitcoin address is a virtual entity which is not necessarily 
bound to a particular person (and it is not necessarily stored on any server). In particular, no registration 
or authentication is necessary to create a bitcoin address. It is even possible for a piece of software to 
create and control new addresses without interaction with a human. Access to a bitcoin address is 
controlled purely by who has access to the corresponding secret key. In that sense, a bitcoin address is 
similar to a numbered bank account where anyone who knows the secret number can withdraw money 
from that account. Given the secret key, any entity (human or not) can make bitcoins move from one 
address to another by sending a digitally signed transaction to one of the many computers participating 
in the bitcoin network. The digital signature is placed using the secret key corresponding to the address.11 
Bitcoins are purely virtual entities in the sense that they do not exist in any other way than by the fact 
that the public ledger says how many bitcoins have moved from which address to which address. The 
public ledger is itself maintained by a distributed process on the Internet, that is, many computers (so-
called ‘nodes’) on the Internet will have a copy of the ledger. A mechanism is in place that ensures that 
all those copies of the ledger will agree with each other. To be precise, it is possible that the different 
copies will disagree on recently performed transactions (e.g. within the last hour). However, after a 
certain time, disagreements will be less and less likely.12 
How do the transfer of control of the virtual currency and the registration take place? After the creation 
of a bitcoin wallet, a person obtains a multi-digit bitcoin address. An address is a hashed version of a 
public key. One person can obtain as many additional addresses as desired and one could use a unique 
address for each transaction. The information about the users and their transaction is recorded in a public 
ledger (inside the so-called blockchain) and is visible to all members of the network. No personal data 
of the users is included, therefore, the bitcoin system does not reveal any personal data. In the words of 
the creator of bitcoin: 'The public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but 
without information linking the transaction to anyone'13.14 
                                                     
10  The analysis provided in parts 2.1, 2.2 and 3.2 is based on and cites a previously unpublished report written by Helen Eenmaa-
Dimitrieva and Dominique Unruh on the architecture and anonymity of Bitcoin transactions for the Supreme Court of 
Estonia. See: Eenmaa-Dimitrieva H, Unruh D. Report on the Architecture and Anonymity of Bitcoin Transactions for the 
Supreme Court of Estonia (7 January 2016) (Here: Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016) 
11  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
12  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
13  Nakamoto S. Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. 2008. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (11 July 2017, date last 
accessed) 6. Of course, it is worth noticing, as we in length below, that while no personal data of the users is included in 
the transactions, this is not a guarantee of anonymity. As soon as a secret key is linked to an individual by other means, all 
his or her transactions can potentially be revealed. 
14  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
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Once connected to the network, there are three ways to obtain bitcoins.15 
• First, a user can exchange conventional money (e.g. dollars, yen, and Euros) for bitcoins for a fee 
on an online exchange (e.g. Okcoin, Coinbase, and Kraken). 
• Second, a user can obtain bitcoins in exchange for the sale of goods or services, as when a 
merchant accepts bitcoin from a buyer for the sale of his product. 
• Third, users within the bitcoin network, known as miners, can gather together blocks of new 
transactions and compete to verify that the transactions are valid, i.e. that the buyer has the amount 
of bitcoins being spent and has transferred that amount to the seller’s address. The miners are 
willing to do this work due to the bitcoin payment they receive once they succeed in verifying a 
particular transaction.16 
Bitcoin transactions take place by digitally signing hashes of previous transactions (indicating the 
transactions through which the bitcoins were originally received) and the public key of the next owner 
(or entity which knows the secret key corresponding to the next owner’s bitcoin address) and 
broadcasting these. The purpose of miners is to enter the transactions into the public ledger. For 
providing this service, miners that successfully verify a block of transactions are rewarded by the bitcoin 
network with newly created bitcoins. To transfer an amount x of bitcoins from one bitcoin address A to 
another bitcoin address B, the following steps take place:17 
• Someone (presumably the 'owner' of address A, but it could be any entity which knows the secret 
key corresponding to address A) creates a digital signature that signs a message that essentially 
says 'Transfer x bitcoins from address A to address B'. This signature needs to be signed with the 
secret key of address A. 
• That signature is sent to one or many entities participating in the bitcoin network. These entities 
further distribute the signature between themselves so that, barring network failures or similar 
problems, all entities have the same signatures. At this point, the signatures are not yet contained 
in the public ledger, but are candidates for inclusion. 
• Many entities in the bitcoin network (so-called miners) continuously try to solve certain difficult 
computational problems. Whenever a miner solves such a problem, he can append a new block of 
data to the public ledger (which is why that ledger is called a blockchain). Once this has happened 
the transaction of x bitcoins from A to B will be in the public ledger. Addition of the new block to 
the ledger is subject to the acceptance of all contained signatures and transactions and the new 
block by the majority of the rest of the bitcoin network, and only if the address A had a sufficient 
balance.18 
From that moment on, whoever has access to the secret key of address B will be able to transfer the 
bitcoins further. Also, from that moment on, next blocks can connect to the block containing the 
transaction between A and B. Invalid transactions will not be included in the blockchain and will not be 
accepted as the basis for next blocks. The more blocks are built after the block containing the particular 
transaction the smaller is the possibility of this transaction being wrong or fraudulent. Merchants usually 
wait until certain amount of blocks are built upon the block containing the payment for their goods or 
services to consider the payment completed. The miners clearly have an important role in verifying that 
                                                     
15  It is worth noticing that operating a public blockchain relies on affordable and ubiquitous connectivity. Internet infrastructure 
is key to the use and operation of blockchain. 
16  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
17  Strictly speaking, the bitcoins are not transferred from the address A, but from the output of an earlier transaction that had 
address A as the recipient. For the purposes of this exposition, however, this distinction is immaterial. 
18  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
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the transactions are valid and are incentivised to do so with the bitcoins paid to them once they succeed 
in the verification process.19 
On a higher level, a bitcoin transaction has the following properties: 
• Anyone who knows the secret key of the sending address can perform a transaction to another 
address. 
• All transactions are public, that is, the complete transaction ledger can be accessed by any person 
on the Internet. 
• In the ledger, bitcoin addresses are represented by numbers (that is, public keys). No connection 
between physical or legal persons and the bitcoin addresses is enforced or maintained.20 
It is worth noting that the creator of bitcoin has suggested a simple method of verification whether the 
transfer of bitcoins took place. He points out that all blocks bear a proof of time when they were created 
(timestamp). A user needs to link the transaction to the block in which it is timestamped. He is not able 
to check the content of the transaction, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network 
node has accepted it, and the blocks added after it further confirm that network has accepted it21. We 
could say, the transfer of control of bitcoins is recorded and verified by the means of blockchain 
protocol.22 
Now let us see which information if any is visible to and can be inspected by the public or a facilitator 
of an exchange (e.g. a Bitcoin exchange or a currency exchange bureau). Let us assume for now that we 
talk about an exchange of a normal currency (e.g. EUR, USD, etc.) for bitcoins and vice versa. In such 
a case, the facilitator of the exchange has access to all data in the public ledger as any other user of 
bitcoin system. Facilitators of the exchange do not hold any privileged position within the bitcoin system 
which would allow them access to more information. In such cases of exchange, two processes happen: 
• Real/normal currency is transferred from the client to the facilitator (or vice versa) 
• Bitcoins are transferred from the facilitator to the client (or vice versa)23 
The first of these transactions is independent of bitcoin. Since normal currency changes hands, the 
visible information depends on the method of transferring this currency. For example, if real currency 
is paid to the facilitator via credit card, then the facilitator will know the credit card number and whatever 
data is provided by the credit card company. If the facilitator pays the real currency to a bank account, 
the facilitator will know the bank account number. Thus, the first transaction involves external (i.e. 
imposed from the outside of the bitcoin system) obligation to collect certain information prior to the 
exercise of exchange.24 
In the second transaction, the facilitator cannot check whether the bitcoins go to or come from the client. 
The facilitator will know from which bitcoin address the bitcoins come, or to which bitcoin address the 
bitcoins go. However, the facilitator cannot check whether this address belongs to the client. In the case 
where the facilitator receives bitcoins, he will of course know that the client has control over the address, 
since otherwise the client would not be able to pay the facilitator. The facilitator (and anyone else) can 
track the past and future flow of bitcoins from that bitcoin address (as well as any other bitcoin address). 
On the basis of this, statistical analysis of data may allow identifying the users of bitcoin addresses. 
                                                     
19  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
20  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
21  Nakamoto S. Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. 2008. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (11 July 2017, date last 
accessed) 5 
22  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
23  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
24  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
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Methods of such analysis will be described in more detail immediately below when discussing the 
anonymity of parties.25 
2.2. Nature of anonymity on public blockchains 
Let us look into the nature of anonymity of the parties in case of public blockchains. We shall do this 
once again by using the example of Bitcoin. In a transaction which involves the exchange of bitcoins 
against normal currency, the anonymity depends on the mechanism used. For example, in a cash 
payment, anonymity is achievable, while a bank transaction will usually reveal the name of the client.26 
The transfer of bitcoins is anonymous to some degree. While the bitcoin system does keep track of 
bitcoin addresses, it does not keep track of address ownership (whoever has the secret key controls the 
address). Since it does not keep track of ownership, the address to which the bitcoins are transferred or 
from which they come do not have to belong to the given client. In particular, the facilitator cannot 
record the identity of the owner of the address.27 
However, anonymity is not absolute. Since all money flows are publicly visible in the public bitcoin 
ledger, it can be possible to use statistical tools to guess at the identity of the owner of a given bitcoin 
address. However, a user that wishes to maintain his anonymity can hide the money flows by transferring 
the money to a so-called 'mixing service' which collects money from many users and redistributes the 
money to other, otherwise unrelated addresses of the same users. This allows obfuscating the money 
flow from one address to another, making the bitcoin address anonymous.28 
In summary: 
• Bitcoin addresses are not bound to user identities. 
• The anonymity of bitcoin addresses can nevertheless be broken in some cases. This can be avoided 
by the use of mixing services. 
• The facilitator of an exchange does not have the possibility to record whose bitcoin address he is 
transferring money to or from (i.e. the identities of the persons whose bitcoin addresses these are), 
but he can record which bitcoin address the money is transferred to or from (i.e. just the multi-
digit bitcoin addresses, which are the hashed versions of the public keys). 
• The facilitator of an exchange can record information about the identity of the person getting or 
paying the normal currency if the normal currency is transferred in a way that is not anonymous. 
(e.g. with bank transfers it is possible, with cash payments it is not unless an ID is requested.)29 
Is it possible for the facilitator of the exchange of bitcoins to save data about its clients and verify the 
identity of the clients? Many organizations and services such as online stores that accept bitcoins and 
facilitator of the exchange have access to identifying information regarding their users, e.g. e-mail 
addresses, shipping addresses, credit card and bank account details, IP addresses, etc30. In an exchange 
of bitcoins for normal currency or vice versa, the facilitator can save data about the identity of the person 
with which the transfer occurs. In this case, the data is collected and stored not under the bitcoin protocol 
and rules. Such information is not recorded in the blockchain. Online merchants and facilitators of the 
                                                     
25  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
26  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
27  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
28  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
29  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
30  Reid F, Harrigan M. An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin System. In: Altshuler Y, Elovici Y, Cremers A, Aharony N, 
Pentland A (eds). Security and Privacy in Social Networks. New York: Springer, 2013, 197-223. 
https://users.encs.concordia.ca/~clark/biblio/bitcoin/Reid%202011.pdf (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 15 
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exchange are expected to collect and store the data according to the applicable laws and their policies. 
The regulations and policies extend only to situations where the bitcoins are exchanged for traditional 
currencies or goods.31 
There are facilitators of exchange of bitcoins that require no identifying information from their users 
and these facilitators are popular among users not wishing to share their personal information. It is the 
choice of user which facilitator of the exchange to choose.32 
Even if the facilitator has chosen and declared not to collect any identifying information, it still has huge 
amounts of information recorded in the blockchain. This includes a traceable trail of each transaction. 
The facilitator is able to record to which and from which bitcoin address the bitcoins flow, but the 
facilitator cannot ensure that the address belongs to the same person as the one transferring the normal 
currency. Despite the fact that the information is not linked to a particular user it could still be used to 
identify parties to the transaction. Possible ways to reveal the identity of the bitcoin users will be 
discussed in the section below.33 
Would it be consistent with the bitcoin protocol and rules to implement a review procedure, which would 
require a decrease in the anonymity principle characteristic of bitcoin sales transactions? The bitcoin 
protocol requires full publicity in order to operate successfully and allow transaction verification. Each 
transaction with bitcoins is visible to each member of the network, i.e. to all other people/entities who 
own, accept as payment, and exchange bitcoins to other currencies. The bitcoin transactions can be 
reviewed to the extent that the amount of bitcoins which flows from certain address to another at a 
specific time is public. This is an inherent feature of the bitcoin system. However, as the identities of 
the users who initiate these transactions are not contained in the public ledger, all the information 
accessible in the system is of little use for the state authorities for the purposes of the review procedure.34 
Theoretically, public authorities may require the bitcoin exchange service providers to check the identity 
of the person who wishes to open a bitcoin wallet or exchange bitcoin for conventional currency. 
However, the efficiency of such a review procedure is questionable. To be effective, such rules should 
be implemented globally. If the review procedure is implemented only in a few countries, the users will 
simply switch to the bitcoin exchange service providers in other countries where there is no review 
procedure in place. Bitcoin exchange services are provided via the Internet and any person is free to 
choose the provider regardless of the provider’s place of establishment.35 
The bitcoin protocol cannot be extended to keep track of users’ identities without major changes. Those 
changes would need to be adopted by the majority of users in the worldwide bitcoin protocol. It is not 
possible to change the protocol only within a given jurisdiction. Since there is no central authority that 
performs the bitcoin transactions, no procedures can be imposed on such an authority.36 
2.3. Smart contracts 
Blockchain enables not only the creation of decentralized currencies like Bitcoin, but also intelligent 
assets that can be controlled over the Internet (smart property), new governance systems with more 
democratic or participatory decision-making, decentralized or autonomous organizations that can 
                                                     
31  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
32  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
33  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
34  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
35  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
36  Eenmaa-Dimitrieva and Unruh Report 2016 
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operate over a network of computers without any human intervention as well as self-executing digital 
transactions (smart contracts).37  
Based on the standard operating principles of markets and legal environments, the complete anonymity 
between parties, as illustrated by the description of the general operating mechanisms of public 
blockchain above, should be a red flag for anyone wishing to draw up and execute a contract. Until 
recently, such complete anonymity would provide for the paradigm set of circumstances where we 
would imagine needing a reliable system of contract law (or other legal mechanisms) in order to 
compensate for the challenges posed by greater risk for negative outcomes, bad faith, inability to track 
down the other party and general distrust. This is because, due to anonymity, the contract was not 
embedded in any social context that could work as an alternative enforcement mechanism to ensure that 
all parties cooperate. 
Yet, this is precisely the environment in which smart contracts seem to bring about a disruption. They 
seem to be able to function in such contracting environments where parties could meet in complete 
anonymity. We will explain below how this feature sets smart contracts apart as new modes of 
contracting governance and as vehicles for contracting in no-trust environments, possibly not relying on 
formal contract law. While the impact of smart is potentially broader, in this paper, we confine our 
argument solely to their effects on contracting and relations with contract law. The argument is the 
following: 
1. Parties to smart contracts on public blockchains can remain anonymous (to an extent and 
depending on the substantive content of the contract) (part 2.2, part 2.3 and part 2.4). 
2. When you have anonymity you have a no-trust environment for contracting (part 3.1). 
3. In order to contract in no-trust environments, there is a need for an enforcement 
mechanism which provides sufficient safeguards for contracting  (part 3.1). 
4. Smart contracts can provide sufficient safeguards for enforcement (part 3.2). 
5. Such safeguards could be either invasive regarding anonymity (e.g. by using permissioned 
blockchains) (part 3.2) or, as a better alternative, be incorporated into smart contracts to 
avoid certain inefficiencies arising from their automated execution (on public blockchain 
where the anonymity is defining feature) (part 3.3, part 3.4 and part 3.5). 
While developing this account, we also point out why it might be helpful to draw a distinction between 
smart contracts based on public blockchains and smart contracts based on permissioned blockchains. 
We also argue that we should not develop smart contracts exclusively based on permissioned 
blockchains. Public blockchains offer advantages over permissioned blockchains for the development 
of smart contracts, which should not be ignored. 
There are several debates about the nature of smart contracts. Today, they are mostly understood as 
agreements that are encoded in computer code and placed on a decentralized virtual infrastructure (in 
short, a self-executing agreements based on blockchain technology). Computer protocols are there to 
verify and enforce the clauses and performance of a contract thus making some traditional contractual 
activities involved in the enforcement unnecessary. The technology allows automatically implementing 
and enforcing the terms of an agreement. It also makes it possible for parties to preserve their anonymity 
while contracting with each other. The literature includes a wide range of definitions for smart contracts 
that vary mostly due to the different points of emphasis.38 The common defining characteristic of smart 
                                                     
37  Wright A, De Filippi P. Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia. Social Science Research 
Network 2015 http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (July 11 2017, date last accessed) 1 
38  See a variety of different definitions e.g. in Szabo N. Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, Extropy 1996; 
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contracts is, however, that they are executed and enforced automatically without the need of human 
intervention.39 
To illustrate the concept of smart contracts, let us look at a practical example of using it for renting a 
vacation home on the weekend at the beach in case of good weather. Landlord and tenant agree on the 
price for renting the home on the weekend to be a quarter of a bitcoin.40 They also agree that in case of 
a bad weather forecast for the weekend on the preceding Thursday, the tenant will not come, and there 
will be no payment.  
In a first step, all these clauses are translated into computer code and placed on a blockchain after having 
been validated in the consensus process.41 From this moment, any tampering with the smart contract 
would probably be detectable. Assuming that the underlying blockchain is public, all users are able to 
observe and testify the correctness of the agreement. 
In a second step, the smart contract will connect with an oracle,42 in this case a specified database or 
website with weather forecasts on the Thursday preceding the vacation weekend. If the weather forecast 
predicts rain, the smart contract will stop at this point. In case the weather forecast predicts sunny and 
warm weather, the smart contract will proceed with the execution of the contract, which entails the 
processing of the rent payment and the release of the key on the weekend.  
In a third step, the smart contract automatically evaluates whether the connected bitcoin wallet of the 
tenant actually contains the relevant amount of bitcoins. If the bitcoin wallet does not have sufficient 
funds to pay the landlord, the smart contract will not release the key of the vacation home (e.g. in the 
form a door code) to the tenant. In case the bitcoin wallet of the tenant contains the funds, the smart 
contract will, in a fourth step, self-execute the agreement. It will cause the transfer of the relevant amount 
of bitcoins from the tenant’s bitcoin wallet to the landlord’s bitcoin wallet, and it will release the key to 
the tenant on a specified date and time. In further steps, the contract will withdraw the key when the 
rental period is over. If the contract included clauses regarding a security deposit or the condition in 
which the vacation home needs to be returned, further transfers or connection with an oracle might take 
place as well. 
This is an example of a smart contract implementing a traditional contract that intends to create binding 
rights and obligations between parties. While other types of automated contracts43 also embody 
                                                     
Terminology Guide. Ethereum Blog (6 May 2014) https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacsdas-and-more-an-
incomplete-terminology-guide/ (14 April 2017, date last accessed); Marvin R. Blockchain in 2017: The Year of Smart 
Contracts. PC MAG (12 December 2016) http://www.pcmag.com/article/350088/blockchain-in-2017-the-year-of-smart-
contracts (12 June 2017, date last accessed); The Economist. Not-so-clever Contracts. (28 June 2016)  
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21702758-time-being-least-human-judgment-still-better-bet-cold-hearted (11 
July 2017, date last accessed). 
39  This definition is similar to the definitions provided in Werbach K, Cornell N. Contracts Ex Machina. Duke Law Journal. 
Forthcoming. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2936294 (11 July 2017, date last accessed), Wright A, De Filippi P. Decentralized 
Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia. Social Science Research Network 2015 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (July 11 2017, date last accessed) 10-11, and Raskin M. The Law and Legality of 
Smart Contracts. Georgetown Law and Technology Review 2017; 1: 305-341. https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2959166 (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 309. 
40  The current value of one bitcoin is around USD 2800 (exchange rate on on 12 June 2017). 
41  A consensus process an algorithm that ensures that every next block on a blockchain is the one and single version of the 
truth and prevents any tampering by parties trying to corrupt the system. It is called consensus, because a majority of the 
nodes in the system has to confirm the correctness of the transactions included in a new block. The best known consensus 
algorithm is bitcoin’s proof of work, further discussed below. 
42  Oracles are 'independent entities to inform contracts about the state of the outside world.' See:  Thomas S, Schwartz E. Smart 
Oracles: A Simple, Powerful Approach to Smart Contracts. https://github.com/codius/codius/wiki/Smart-Oracles:-A-
Simple,-Powerful-Approach-to-Smart-Contracts (11 July 2017, date last accessed). For a further discussion of oracles see 
section 3.5 below. 
43  Surden H. Computable Contracts. UC Davis Law Review 2012; 46: 629-700 
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agreements in software code and even perform automatically in limited circumstances, smart contracts 
are considered to be advanced in the sense that they handle the full lifecycle of contractual activity and 
their performance is final. Performance cannot be inhibited or undone within the system of the 
blockchain.44 
There is also a good reason for the definitions to vary. Smart contracts indeed can have different 
functions as a smart contract in the technical sense is not necessarily the same as a contractual agreement. 
At times, a smart contract indeed represents the translation of a specific contractual agreement with legal 
force between two parties. In other cases, smart contracts codify relationships 'that are both defined and 
automatically enforced by code, but which are not linked to any underlying contractual rights or 
obligations'.45 In these cases, the term “smart contract” loses any legal meaning and becomes a technical 
term in the world of computer engineering. There are, for example, smart contract models for one party 
only.46 In the latter case, smart contracts might be used to coordinate tasks between different units of an 
organization. To function, these smart contracts will need immediate access to organizational 
information external to the blockchain, such as the organization’s internal data and business processes.47 
One-party smart contracts, and their underlying blockchain system, are therefore also technologically 
different from bilateral or multi-sided smart contracts.48 
2.4. Smart contracts on public and permissioned blockchains 
In general, one could build and use a public blockchain ('fully decentralized'), a consortium blockchain 
('partially decentralized'), or a private blockchain ('centralized') for building smart contracts on top.49 
Consortium and private blockchains are usually referred to jointly as permissioned blockchains. The 
three core technologies that make up blockchain technology (a distributed network of computers that 
keeps a chronological database of all transactions (the ledger), the use of cryptographic keys, and a 
network servicing protocol (the consensus mechanism, for example mining in the case of bitcoin)50 can 
be designed in different ways depending on the type of the blockchain needed for the particular purpose.  
The choice between operating a public or permissioned blockchain has implications for:  
1. The identifiability of persons transacting on blockchain,  
2. The selection of nodes and size of network as well as the related expenses,  
3. The particularities of consensus mechanism and  
4. The openness of the content of the blocks.  
Let us describe the different types of blockchains based on these four characteristics.  
                                                     
44  For a more detailed discussion partially relativizing this statement see section 3.4. 
45  Wright A, De Filippi P. Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia. Social Science Research 
Network 2015 http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (July 11 2017, date last accessed) 11 
46  Kim HM, Laskowski M. A Perspective on Blockchain Smart Contracts: Reducing Uncertainty and Complexity in Value 
Exchange. Working Paper. 2017 http://blockchain.lab.yorku.ca/files/2017/05/UBC_blockchain_paper_HK_and-
Marek.pdf (11 July 2017, date last accessed)  
47  Kim HM, Laskowski M. A Perspective on Blockchain Smart Contracts: Reducing Uncertainty and Complexity in Value 
Exchange. Working Paper. 2017 http://blockchain.lab.yorku.ca/files/2017/05/UBC_blockchain_paper_HK_and-
Marek.pdf (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
48  Kim HM, Laskowski M. A Perspective on Blockchain Smart Contracts: Reducing Uncertainty and Complexity in Value 
Exchange. Working Paper. 2017 http://blockchain.lab.yorku.ca/files/2017/05/UBC_blockchain_paper_HK_and-
Marek.pdf (11 July 2017, date last accessed)  
49  Buterin V. On Public and Private Blockchains. Ethereum Blog (7 August 2015) https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-
public-and-private-blockchains/ (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
50  Coindesk. How Does Blockchain Technology Work. http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-does-blockchain-
technology-work/ (12 July 2017, date last accessed) 
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Public blockchains. The most prominent example of a public blockchain is bitcoin. In the case of 
bitcoin, the underlying blockchain is a truly public space.  
1. Identifiability: On a public blockchain, anyone can make use of it and join the network 
anonymously. As a result, for example, the identity behind a bitcoin public key can be difficult 
to establish.51  
2. Selection of nodes: Any computer can become a node in the network. The reliability of nodes 
and the growth of the blockchain network is difficult to control. Not having restrictions on who 
can participate can pose challenges if changes in governance of the blockchain are necessary, as 
the consensus from a majority of servicing nodes will be required to implement any rule 
changes.52  
3. Consensus: On a public blockchain, anyone can participate in the consensus mechanism. In the 
case of bitcoin, we use so-called proof-of-work as consensus mechanism. Proof-of-work requires 
participants in the consensus mechanism (‘miners’) to compete against each other in solving 
computationally-intensive mathematical problems in the process of validating a transaction and 
adding a block to the blockchain. In order to incentivize individuals to provide computational 
power for the validation of transactions,53 miners are rewarded in bitcoin for servicing the bitcoin 
network. The proof-of-work mechanism makes the bitcoin network secure against fraud or 
corruption, and its security grows with the number of miners. There are many blockchain 
entrepreneurs (including those working on smart contracts) who attempt to achieve validated 
transactions with the proof-of-stake consensus mechanism, which is less demanding in terms of 
resources, but provides a comparable level of security. In case of proof-of-stake mechanism, the 
creator of a new block is chosen in a deterministic way, depending on its wealth. Since there is 
no block reward for creating the new block, then the creators take transaction fees (and for that 
reason are not called miners but validators or forgers). One should keep in mind that in case of 
proof-of-work, not having restrictions on who can participate in the consensus mechanism can 
offer a good defence against hacking (bad actors are cut out thanks to technological and economic 
disincentives). For similar defence, the proof-of-stake mechanism needs to implement a different 
algorithm which disincentivizes hacking (bad actors are cut out thanks to economic 
disincentives).54 
4. Openness: Public blockchains also have a high degree of openness. Anyone can read the content 
of the blocks on the bitcoin blockchain. While this might not be problematic in case of bitcoin, 
the openness of public blockchain can pose a challenge if the content of blocks contains sensitive 
information.55 
It has been considered an important advantage of blockchain technology - particularly when it comes to 
a public blockchain - that the transactions it facilitates are public and shared. This creates transparency 
which has been considered to support the trustworthiness and security of the technology for accounting 
for transactions. By allowing a countless number of parties to maintain a correct record of their 
transactions it also allows them to get rid of some centralized, powerful, corruptible middlemen with 
                                                     
51  See discussion of bitcoin above for further details. 
52  Monax. Explainer: Permissioned Blockchains. https://monax.io/explainers/permissioned_blockchains/ (12 July, date last 
accessed) 
53  The payment to miners in bitcoin acts as market-based mechanism to overcome an otherwise ensuing tragedy-of-the-
commons problem. Since a public blockchain has public good characteristics, nobody would be willing to service the 
bitcoin network in the absence of payment. 
54  BlockGeeks. Proof of Work vs Proof of Stake: Basic Mining Guide. https://blockgeeks.com/guides/proof-of-work-vs-proof-
of-stake/ (14 July 2017, date last accessed) 
55  This could be for example the case for information about individuals in healthcare applications based on blockchain. 
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their own agendas and interests by replacing them with algorithms.56 This is a nearly ideal setting for 
even bigger, better, faster, and cheaper transactions.57 
One of the well-known platforms of smart contracts on public blockchains is Ethereum.58 Some of its 
possible applications include money management (the creation of cryptocurrencies), other financial apps 
(crowdfunding and crowd sales), voting systems and governance systems, including decentralized 
autonomous organizations. Ethereum was developed against the backdrop that all other blockchain 
projects after Bitcoin had been based on specific protocols aimed at providing financial services or tools 
for enhanced cryptocurrencies. While other projects had taken off using the Bitcoin infrastructure to 
provide different applications, such as Mastercoin and Counterparty, Ethereum’s founder, Vitalik 
Buterin, aimed at providing a wholly new blockchain infrastructure that would allow for a much wider 
range of application than just cryptocurrencies.59 
In 2016, a decentralized autonomous organization project (the ‘DAO’) was launched on Ethereum’s 
public blockchain using a nexus of smart contracts.60 In the particular project, the idea was to have an 
investment entity which is fully controlled by shareholders, without a central management team.61 The 
work of management was to be replaced by autonomously running smart contracts. The project received 
USD 150 million in Ether62 in a crowdfunding initiative. Shortly after the project was launched, a hacker 
managed to divert Ether worth USD 50 million from the organization, which ultimately led to the 
collapse of the project.63 An interesting open question is whether the taking, which simply exploited a 
weakness in the code, was breaching the contract or simply following the contract as implemented in 
the code.64 
Consortium blockchains are blockchains that are used by a limited number of participants and designed 
to fit the needs of a particular industry.65 Examples include the R3 Corda project66 and Enterprise 
                                                     
56  There are arguably still middlemen left, for example the miners that help implement the consensus process. Nonetheless, 
single miners lack the central power of intermediaries that blockchain could replace, such as banks, public administration, 
and large internet intermediaries. 
57  It might be important to stress here that we talk about trust towards the technology underlying smart contracts. We do not 
talk about building trust among customers towards any particular service or other applications of blockchain technology or 
smart contracts. 
58  Ethereum was founded in 2014 and describes itself as 'a Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application 
Platform'. See: Ethereum White Paper. A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform. 
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
59  Buterin V. Ethereum: A Next-Generation Cryptocurrency and Decentralized Application Platform. Bitcoin Magazine (23 
January 2014) https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/ethereum-next-generation-cryptocurrency-decentralized-application-
platform-1390528211/ (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
60  For the general foundations, see Buterin V. DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide. Ethereum 
Blog (6 May 2014) https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/ (12 
July 2017, date last accessed) 
61  Raskin M. The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts. Georgetown Law and Technology Review 2017; 1: 305-341. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2959166 (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 336 
62  Ether is Ethereum’s cryptocurrency. 
63  Popper N. Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the World of Virtual Currency. New York Times (16 June 
2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-removedmore-than-50-million-from-
experimental-cybercurrency-project.html (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
64  Levine M. Blockchain Company's Smart Contracts Were Dumb. Bloomberg View (17 June 2016) http://www.bloom 
berg.com/view/articles/2016-06-17/blockchain-company-s-smart-contractswere-dumb (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
65  Buterin V. On Public and Private Blockchains, Ethereum Blog (7 August 2015) https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-
public-and-private-blockchains/ (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
66  Brown RG. Introducing R3 Corda: A Distributed Ledger Designed for Financial Services, Blog Post (5 April 2017) 
http://www.r3cev.com/blog/2016/4/4/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-for-financial-services (11 July 
2017, date last accessed) 
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Ethereum Alliance.67 In a consortium blockchain, a central entity determines who may act as a 
participant in the consensus mechanism which validates transactions, and writes them into the 
blockchain. Equally, that central authority can predetermine who can act as a user making transactions 
on the blockchain. As such, consortium blockchains are seen to deliver the advantages of trustworthiness 
and security while helping to meet some of the challenges that public blockchains pose for organizations. 
1. Identifiability: Since blockchain participants must first be authorized to transact on the 
blockchain, their identities can be verified.  
2. Selection of nodes: Only authorized machines can become nodes in the blockchain network. As 
validators are known and trusted by the consortium, and their number will be relatively small, 
reaching consensus is easier. This facilitates the changing of rules, the reversal of transactions or 
other modifications in the blockchain. Such increased flexibility can be a drawback, however, if 
the aim of a blockchain is absolute immutability to avoid any form of manipulation of the ledger. 
3. Consensus: Since only selected participants can act as validators in the consensus mechanism 
and their number can be controlled, the consensus mechanism becomes cheaper and faster 
compared to a public blockchain. The consensus mechanism does not need to be as resource-
consuming as proof-of-work, and since a smaller amount of nodes will be engaged in the 
consensus process, blocks will be added at higher speed to the blockchain.68 Furthermore, it 
might be possible to do away with the necessity of an inbuilt market-based incentive mechanism 
in the consensus process (in case of bitcoin this incentive is the reward in bitcoins to miners), 
which is always needed in a public blockchain system.69 
4. Openness: Consortium blockchain designers can choose to hide the content of blocks on the 
blockchain and make it available only to certain users affected by a specific transaction. Privacy 
issues posed by wholly public blockchains can thus be avoided.70 
Private blockchains are blockchains which are entirely managed by a single organization, a group of 
people, or a single person. While they generally share the properties of consortium blockchains, when 
operating wholly private blockchains, the decentralized nature of system is lost. The operators continue 
to benefit from the other advantages of the use of blockchain technology, e.g. the ability to maintain 
data integrity and the correctness of transactions. As Buterin puts it, a private blockchain is however 
little more than 'a traditional centralized system with a degree of cryptographic auditability attached'.71 
An example of a wholly private blockchain is JP Morgan’s experiment with Quorum (an Ethereum-
based permissioned blockchain architecture) in its internal Global Network Payments initiative.7273 
                                                     
67  Enterprise Ethereum Alliance. https://entethalliance.org/about/  (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
68  Buterin V. On Public and Private Blockchains, Ethereum Blog (7 August 2015) https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-
public-and-private-blockchains/ (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
69  Monax. Explainer: Permissioned Blockchains https://monax.io/explainers/permissioned_blockchains/ (11 July 2017, date 
last accessed) 
70  Buterin V. On Public and Private Blockchains, Ethereum Blog (7 August 2015) https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-
public-and-private-blockchains/ (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
71  Buterin V. On Public and Private Blockchains, Ethereum Blog (7 August 2015) https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-
public-and-private-blockchains/ (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
72  JP Morgan. Distributed Ledger Technology. https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/distributed-ledger-technology (11 July 2017, 
date last accessed) 
73  It is yet to be confirmed whether we could consider the Keyless Signature Infrastructure (KSI) blockchain technology that 
has been used by the Estonian government next to the traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) as another example of 
private blockchain. The KSI is currently used to preserve the integrity of several vital registries (business registry, land 
registry, e-health records) in Estonia. Estonian government was the first government in the world to embrace the blockchain 
technology in its live production systems and the KSI lies at the foundation of Estonia’s digital society since 2007. The 
government provides scalable digital signature based authentication for electronic data, machines and humans to ensure the 
integrity of systems and data. There are several advantages of doing this in governance, even if the use of non-public 
blockchain does not provide all the acclaimed advantages of a public blockchain. It empowers citizens as each citizen gains 
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In different industries, smart contracts on permissioned blockchains have been used to propose specific 
solutions to particular problems: 
 
Industry Problem Solution Examples 
Banking Clearing and settlements through 
intermediaries is slow and very 
costly. 
Smart contract system helps to 
eliminate intermediaries, as e.g. 
central banks, correspondent 
banks, clearing houses 
R3 Corda74 
Ripple75 
Public Health Sharing of health care data poses 
privacy threats for patients, inter 
alia due to current centralized 
structures of healthcare data 
collection 
Smart contract system helps to 
protect privacy while allowing 
sharing of aggregated data to 
improve national health care 
delivery priorities 
ModelChain76 
 
 
Supply Chain Loss of goods, insurance fraud, 
authenticity of high value goods, 
evaluation of provenance 
Smart contract system would 
create immutable record of good 
along supply chain77 
Everledger78 
Music Royalties Up to 50% of music royalty 
payments are not received by 
right owners79 
Blockchain system could help to 
create a world-wide database of 
music metadata,80 which could 
then in turn be used to trigger 
So far only 
preliminary 
                                                     
an ability to verify the integrity of their records at government databases at will, independently of the government or any 
other third party. It creates government accountability as the KSI makes it impossible for privileged insiders to perform 
illegal acts inside the government networks, and erase the log evidence pointing to their actions without it being 
immediately evident. It also provides long-term data integrity thanks to the fact that KSI is based solely on hash-function 
cryptography, and as such it will not be vulnerable to attacks utilizing quantum computing, unlike RSA-based digital 
signature schemes. For details on the technology, see Buldas A, Kroonmaa A, Laanoja R. Keyless Signatures Infrastructure: 
How to Build Global Distributed Hash-Trees. In: Riis Nielson H, Gollmann D (eds). Secure IT Systems. NordSec 2013. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol 8208. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2013, https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/834.pdf (11 
July 2017, date last accessed) 
74  It should be noted that R3’s CTP claims that Corda is not a blockchain. See Brown RG. Introducing R3 Corda: A Distributed 
Ledger Designed for Financial Services, Blog Post (5 April 2017) http://www.r3cev.com/blog/2016/4/4/introducing-r3-
corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-for-financial-services (11 July 2017, date last accessed). It could be argued, however, 
that it simply is a special type of permissioned blockchain.  
75  Similarly to the case in R3 Corda, Ripple does not claim to be a blockchain system - nonetheless the architecture of its 
network is a form of a permissioned blockchain. See Ripple. Technology. https://ripple.com/technology/ (11 July 2017, 
date last accessed) 
76  Kuo T, Hsu C, Ohno-Machado L. ModelChain: Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Healthcare Predictive Modelling 
Framework on Private Blockchain Networks. ONC/NIST Blockchain in Healthcare and Research Workshop, Gaithersburg, 
MD, September 26-7, 2016.  https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/10-30-ucsd-dbmi-onc-blockchain-challenge.pdf 
(11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
77Kim HM, Laskowski M. Towards an Ontology-Driven Blockchain Design for Supply Chain Provenance. Conference Paper 
for Workshop on Information Technology and Systems (WITS) (15-16 December 2016) https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02922 
(11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
78  See for example London-based start up Everledger: https://www.everledger.io/ (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
79  Botsford, L. BerkleeICE's Rethink Music Releases Report on Transparency and Fairness in the Music Industry. 
https://www.berklee.edu/news/fair_music_report (11 July 2017, date last accessed) 
80  Music Business Worldwide. ASCAP, PRS and SACEM Join Forces for Blockchain Copyright System (9 April 2017) 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/ascap-prs-sacem-join-forces-blockchain-copyright-system/ (11 July 2017, date 
last accessed) 
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automatic royalty payments to 
rightholders through the 
deployment of smart contracts 
proposals81,82 
The financial services industry has been the most active in trying to make use of smart contract 
systems.83 Two areas in which transaction costs could be significantly lowered by the use of smart 
contracts are the settlement of securities transactions and international remittances. The settlement of 
securities transactions takes currently three days (so-called 'T+3') for most types of securities, such as 
stock and corporate bonds, and still involves risks.84 Smart contracts would increase the speed of such 
settlements, make intermediaries like clearing houses redundant, and eliminate risks. Similarly, 
international remittances, i.e. the international money transfers, usually necessitate intermediation by 
correspondent banks.85 The current costs of sending a small international remittance is about 7.7 per 
cent.86 Smart-contract based systems could do away with correspondent banking and could greatly 
reduce the cost, time and safety for sending international remittances.87 
Cross-industry experimentation with smart contracts is just beginning. In February 2017, about thirty 
Fortune 500 companies, including financial institutions, media agencies and technology companies 
decided to join forces to develop a private version of the Ethereum blockchain.88 The project takes place 
under a newly funded non-profit organization, the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance.89 The goal of this 
project is to develop an open standard that could be appropriated by different industries for different 
uses. The project also aims at advancing in tandem with public Ethereum, with the possible future option 
of combining versions of private and public Ethereum.90 It appears that Ethereum is set to evolve into 
the standard blockchain for smart contracts. 
For the rest of our analysis, we will focus on bilateral or multilateral smart contracts that represent 
a translation of a specific contractual agreement with legal force, as our focus is on legal 
implications of smart contracts. Furthermore, we will mainly focus on smart contracts on public 
                                                     
81  Wallach DA. Bitcoin for Rockstars. Wired (12 October 2014) https://www.wired.com/2014/12/bitcoin-for-rockstars/ (11 
July 2017, date last accessed) 
82  Music Business Worldwide. ASCAP, PRS and SACEM Join Forces for Blockchain Copyright System (9 April 2017) 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/ascap-prs-sacem-join-forces-blockchain-copyright-system/ (11 July 2017, date 
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blockchains as they present more challenges from a regulatory perspective, in particular due to 
the possible anonymity or pseudonymity of public blockchain users. In order to still provide 
comprehensive picture of the blockchain landscape, discussions on private blockchains will be included 
in the analysis to illustrate some of their advantages over public blockchain from a regulatory 
perspective.  
3. Safeguards for implementing smart contracts in no-trust environments 
3.1. No-trust environment 
Trade relies on trust. Two parties are likely to only engage in an economic exchange or in another form 
of market-based cooperation if they trust that each party will fulfil their obligations. When  people are 
afraid of being cheated, they will decide not to engage in economic transactions. 
Prior to blockchain, there were two main mechanisms that helped to bring about the necessary trust for 
economic exchange: Peer-to-peer and Leviathan trust mechanisms.91 In peer-to-peer trust environments, 
parties entering into an economic transaction trust that the other party will not behave opportunistically 
because there are social norms in place that will incentivize both parties to fulfill their obligations.92 
Peer-to-peer trust environments are usually limited to close-knit communities that share a common 
background as e.g. a specific profession or trade, culture, language, family ties or religious beliefs. Fear 
of losing reputation will cause members of such a community not to behave opportunistically towards 
other members. 
Leviathan trust environments refer to trust that relies on centralized coercive power, an example being 
formal, government-enforced law. Even though two parties in a Leviathan trust environment might have 
no common community norms, they will engage in economic exchange if they trust the central coercive 
power to force parties to fulfil their obligations. This is the case, for example, when courts enforce 
contract law.  Leviathan trust (law) has come to fill in the trust gaps that have been left by decreasing 
peer-to-peer trust in today’s societies.93  
A form of Leviathan trust can also be generated by non-governmental intermediaries that have the power 
to enforce contracts between people that have subscribed to them. At times, these intermediaries will 
even themselves provide guarantees for performance. In the digital world of sale transactions, these 
include, for example, payment processors such as credit card companies or Paypal that ensure payment 
and assume credit risk in return of a (at times considerable) fee.94  
Arguably, on blockchain, trust between parties (peer-to-peer) or trust in a central authority/intermediary 
(Leviathan) is not necessary for economic exchange to occur. How could blockchain’s 'trustless trust' 
offer a new trust environment for trade?95 How can smart contracts function in no-trust contracting 
environments which are characterized by parties meeting in complete anonymity and there being no 
formal contract law or institutionalized intermediaries for ensuring the enforcement of contracts? The 
answer lies in their technological nature. Due to the success of Bitcoin, the combination of 
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accessed) 4 
92  See also Section 3.6 below on relational theory of contracts. 
93  Werbach K. Trustless Trust. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844409 (14 August 2016, date last accessed) 17. Putnam R. Bowling 
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000, 135 
94  We thank Giorgio Monti for a similar example from the “analogue world”: In the international sale of goods, contracts with 
a time-deferred delivery allow for deferred payment via so-called bills of landing that can be circulated through the seller’s 
and buyer’s bank, so that final payment is only released once the goods have been delivered in conformity with the contract. 
95  Werbach K. Trustless Trust. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844409 (14 August 2016, date last accessed) 538 
Regulation through code as a safeguard for implementing smart contracts in no-trust environments 
European University Institute 17 
decentralization, cryptographic open source protocols, and crypto-proof consensus signals a high degree 
of reliability of blockchain technology.  
In essence, in order to contract in no-trust environments, there is a need for an enforcement mechanism 
which provides sufficient safeguards for contracting. If smart contracts on public blockchain (where 
anonymity is part of the essence) want to operate in such environments they need to incorporate 
safeguards in enforcement. There are two possible tracks in establishing such safeguards.  
• First, we could set higher standards for identification when providing platforms for smart contracts 
and thus be more invasive regarding the anonymity of parties. Using permissioned blockchains or 
creating better mechanisms for tracking transactions and participants on the blockchain are some 
of the options.  
• Second, and a more democratic alternative, as we claim, is incorporating such safeguards into 
smart contracts through remedying some of the inefficiencies arising from automated 
enforcement. 
3.2. Identification as a safeguard for implementing smart contracts 
Let us discuss the first option on the basis of considering possible higher standards for identification on 
public blockchain. We shall use the example of bitcoin assuming that the general underlying principles 
of operating smart contracts on public blockchains are sufficiently similar. We analyzed earlier whether 
it would be possible for the facilitator of the exchange of bitcoins to save data about its clients and verify 
the identity of the clients and whether it would be consistent with the bitcoin protocol and rules to 
implement a review procedure, which would require a decrease in the anonymity principle characteristic 
of bitcoin sales transactions. During the discussion we concluded that the facilitator is indeed able to 
record to which and from which bitcoin address the bitcoins flow, and while the information is not linked 
to a particular user it could still be used to identify parties to the transaction. At the same time, the bitcoin 
protocol cannot be extended to keep track of users’ identities without major changes. Accordingly, there 
are significant difficulties in implementing any review procedures (e.g. where public authorities require 
the bitcoin exchange service providers to check the identity of the person who wishes to open a bitcoin 
wallet or exchange bitcoin for conventional currency). 
While we do not advocate them, one could consider the following tracks for responding to the difficulties 
with implementing bitcoin specific review procedures. First, transactions that involve both bitcoins and 
normal currencies could be regulated. Countries tend to opt for subjecting bitcoin exchanges to the 
existing regulation on financial services. In order for the facilitators of the bitcoin exchange to be fully 
compliant with the regulations governing other financial intermediaries i.e. anti-money laundering laws, 
they could be required to collect some personal data about their customers.96  
For example, whenever someone facilitates an exchange of goods or normal currencies for bitcoins, he 
could be required to keep a record of that transaction, together with the data about the person who 
provided or received the goods or normal currency (for example, the shipping address for the goods 
could be recorded). It is also possible to require vendors and facilitators of exchange to require IDs from 
their clients whenever a transaction is performed (e.g. login via ID card). However, that would:- 
1. make the transactions more complicated because it involves an additional step of authentication; 
2. exclude clients who do not have the means to identify themselves (e.g. clients who do not have 
an ID card or opt not to use it for security reasons); and 
3. make it very difficult for vendors and facilitators of exchange to have clients from other 
jurisdictions where other means of identification are used.97 
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This does not fully eliminate jurisdictional issue explained above, but stays in line with the recent legal 
positions adopted in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU).98 In sum, the option of 
subjecting bitcoin exchanges to the existent regulation on financial services does not interfere with the 
blockchain protocol. Applicable legal rules would rather add several more obligations on the top.99 
Second, regardless of any review procedure, each bitcoin transaction leaves a digital trace which is 
recorded in the public ledger. Because of the public ledger, using sophisticated analysis, transactions 
involving large quantities of bitcoin can be tracked and if paired with current law enforcement tools it 
would be possible to gain a lot of information on the persons involved in the transactions with bitcoins100. 
This information can be used in order to analyse certain information about the users, particularly 
considering that the information is shared by users voluntarily.101 
Several methods of analysing this data are described below. It should be noted that all of them rely on 
certain set of circumstances and do not guarantee 100% traceability of the given transaction or the 
identities of people connected with particular addresses. 
• Order books for bitcoin exchanges are typically available to support trading tools. As orders are 
often placed in bitcoin values converted from other currencies, they have a precise decimal value 
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with eight significant digits. It may be possible to find transactions with corresponding amounts 
and thus map public-keys and transactions to the exchanges;102 
• Over an extended time period, several public-keys, if used at similar times, could in a great 
likelihood belong to the same user. It may be possible to construct and cluster a co-occurrence 
network to help deduce mappings between public-keys and users;103 
• Security researcher Dan Kaminsky has performed an analysis of the bitcoin system, investigating 
identity leakage at the TCP/IP layer. He found that by opening a connection to all public peers in 
the network at once, he could map IP addresses to bitcoin public-keys, working from the 
assumption that 'the first node to inform you of a transaction is the source of it. . . [this is] more or 
less true, and absolutely over time'. Using this approach it is possible to map public-keys to IP 
addresses unless users are using an anonymising proxy technology such as TOR104. The approach 
may not be feasible via a government or facilitator because it involves active hacking (not just the 
evaluation of public data). Biryukov et al. showed that such attacks are even possible when the 
users are behind NAT (Network Address Translation) (the most common case in the current 
bitcoin network)105.106 
The first and second option (regulating transaction together with identification, and tracking) suggested 
above approach the issue from two different stances. Their combined and simultaneous application 
might bring results. Such a review procedure would combine technical methods in data analysis with 
the existing legal rules regulating the provision of financial services, supplementing them in limited 
spheres, as the case may be, by the specific virtual currency regulations.107 Such safeguards for 
enforcement are certainly invasive regarding anonymity and essentially create an overwhelming need 
to use permissioned blockchains for smart contracts.  
3.3. Regulatory challenges 
While we claim that smart contracts can provide sufficient safeguards for enforcement in no-trust 
environment, we do not mean to say that such safeguards could only be invasive regarding anonymity. 
We analyzed this possibility above, but this is not the only available option. A more democratic 
alternative, as we claim, is providing such safeguards by incorporating them into the code of smart 
contracts. In this manner, we avoid certain inefficiencies arising from the automated execution of smart 
contracts and mimic the efficiency-enhancing features of contract law while preserving the anonymity 
of parties, the essential (i.e. the central characteristic) feature of operating on a public blockchain. 
What are the regulatory challenges that we need to meet when considering the regulation of smart 
contracts? The questions of what is the applicable law and what the law should be, become vividly 
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apparent and urgent in case of smart contracts that operate on public blockchains. This derives from the 
facts that:  
• Identifiability: The transactions are pseudonymous and accordingly we are faced with disguised 
identities, which possibly provide a tool for illegal activity; 
• Selection of nodes: Blockchain operates in multiple locations raising jurisdictional matters and 
issues pertaining to the conflict of laws; 
• Consensus: Being immutable, blockchain transactions, by definition, cannot be changed. 
Accordingly, new processes need to be introduced for making alterations in parties’ relations with 
each other, if needed; 
• Openness: Since the transactions are also transparent, they pose a potential privacy threat. 
In contrast, when we take a look at the regulatory challenges for smart contracts operating on 
permissioned blockchains, we see that they might possibly raise less challenges thanks to the fact that: 
• Identifiability: Parties’ identity is verified before allowing use of permissioned blockchain; 
• Selection of nodes: A central entity is at least responsible for giving access to blockchain; 
• Consensus: The verification mechanism could be controlled by a central entity; and 
• Openness: Content of blocks can be hidden avoiding confidentiality issues. 
At first sight, it appears that permissioned blockchains for smart contracts are to be preferred over public 
blockchains as they pose fewer regulatory challenges. The use of permissioned blockchains has 
drawbacks however. As permissioned blockchains are more centralized and contain fewer nodes, they 
are also more vulnerable to outside attacks or to tampering or collusion by insiders. Participants in 
permissioned blockchains will still have to trust the other members of the consortium. Furthermore, 
permissioned blockchains allow for (potentially unjustified) discrimination, as a central entity can 
decide who is to be allowed into the system and who is excluded. 
What would then be the advantages of having smart contracts on public blockchains? The fact that public 
blockchains are open to anyone makes them more democratic than permissioned blockchains. 
Furthermore, the fact that there is absolutely no form of central authority controlling the blockchain 
makes public blockchains more corruption or tampering-proof. It might be worth remembering that the 
ideological fuel for the creation of bitcoin was an aversion against centralized power being held by 
governments, central banks and commercial banks.108 The complete absence of any centralized control 
is a worthwhile goal in itself that can only be offered by public blockchains. 
Turning to smart contracts on public blockchains only, the number and gravity of challenges also 
depends on what purpose the blockchain-powered smart contracts are used for. When we look beyond 
using blockchain for transactions into using it for substituting traditional organizations and governance 
systems, we also need to take into account the challenges that arise for the society as a whole. Until now 
they have been met with the help of national or international legal tools, but if we move towards 
operating via decentralized organizations and platforms, we also need new ways to mitigate the risks 
that this creates. For example, we need to think whether and how to defend markets and other aspects 
of good life when we use blockchain instead of central organizations. Additionally, we need to think 
how to implement safety-measures or procedures when they are needed, considering that the 
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technologies could operate without central authorities like central registries,109 central adjudication,110 
or intermediaries such as banks, brokers, custodians.111 There may be continued interest in a number of 
safety-measures, which the markets together with the governmental institutions are currently providing 
us. Accordingly, the regulatory and institutional challenge is to ensure the continued existence of safety 
measures like for example:  
• Mandatory rules in contract law that remedy market failures;112 
• Protection mechanisms like consumer protection, investor protection, protection of competition 
on the market; 
• Measure for keeping certain activities within the socially permitted boundaries (boundaries to 
terrorist financing or money laundering); 
• Responses to social needs, including censorship needs, asset location important for seizing.113 
How could we respond to these challenges when operating on blockchains? What would it mean to 
provide sufficient safeguards for contract enforcement in such an environment, if we leave the 
possibilities of identification and tracking discussed above aside?   
Many have suggested that technologies can operate as a kind of law, regulating behavior of their users.114 
According to Lawrence Lessig '[i]f the system incorporates regulation-through-code, self-executing 
code will be regulatory-compliant, and the choice presented to individual actors will no longer be 
whether to comply or not, but will merely be whether or not to use the system.'115 It has been recognized 
in the legal academy that technology could have a constitutive role, following a similar broader 
understanding within science and technology studies.116 There are hopes that this vision might 
particularly be able to materialize with the help of blockchain and smart contracts. We see statements 
that 'Smart contracts don’t have a need in a legal system to exist: they may operate without any 
overarching legal framework. De facto, they represent a technological alternative to the whole legal 
system.'117 'Smart contracts are unprecedented methods of ensuring contractual compliance, including 
social contracts.'118 Or, smart contracts are computerized versions of an English language paper contract, 
with a level of automation that essentially provides 'adjudication-as-a-service', a hyper real-time version 
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of the court system.119 At the same time, we should be clear that while there is great potential in 
blockchain, judging on the basis of several new developments in the area of smart contracts, traditional 
legal enforcement seems to be still kept available at the moment as a backstop.120 
This should not keep us from analyzing what should the law that operates as part of the code be like. 
Let us take a look at the regulatory challenges of smart contracts from the perspective of law and 
economics. 
3.4. Efficiency considerations regarding safeguards for implementing smart contracts  
The discipline of law and economics takes legal reality and analyses it from an economic efficiency 
perspective.121 The area of contract law has been of particular interest to law and economic scholars, 
because it is the legal regime that applies to agreements between parties, which underpin trade. Trade, 
in turn, is a socially desirable activity because it increases economic welfare.122 The economic function 
of contract law is considered to be the prevention of inefficient opportunistic behavior between parties 
engaged in economic exchange. The coercive nature of law, obliging parties to fulfill their contractual 
obligations, has been seen to ensure sustained cooperation in exchange.123 Further studies have explained 
how social mechanisms other than contract law ensure cooperation between parties in economic 
exchange in the long term. We will take a look a subset in the studies of social cooperation mechanisms 
which is generally referred to as relational theory of contract.124 
Smart contracts seem to hold the promise of providing huge efficiencies over traditional contracts, but 
as Werbach and Cornell point out, we still need to explain how smart contracts can offer a superior 
solution to the problems that contract law addresses.125 Twenty years ago, Szabo expected smart 
contracts to improve four basic contract objectives: the observability (both parties can observe each 
other’s performance), the verifiability (easy verification if and when contract has been performed), 
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privity (only the necessary details for completion of the contract are revealed) and enforceability 
(automatic self-enforcement).126 Werbach and Cornell conclude their recent study on the potential and 
the limitations of smart contracts with somewhat more careful statement. According to them, smart 
contracts may significantly alter the commercial world, and will demand new legal responses, but will 
not displace contract law.  
When we look into how smart contracts operate below, we will first discuss the potentially 
inefficient features of smart contracts when compared to traditional contracts and then explain 
why the smart contracts still have the potential to dramatically reduce costs compared to 
traditional contracts. The purpose of this section is to delineate some of the mechanisms that make 
contract law efficient according to mainstream law and economics, and that potential critics could claim 
to be difficult to replicate in the code of smart contracts. After that, we will discuss how to overcome 
some of these criticisms through the design of smart contracts. 
This section is based on arguments provided in recent literature on smart contracts that tries to evaluate 
them from a contract law perspective.127 In this literature, shortcomings of smart contracts compared to 
traditional, court-enforced contracts are highlighted. Some of the claimed advantages of traditional 
contracts over smart contracts are also advantages from an efficiency perspective. In a first step, we will 
therefore pick up the criticisms of smart contracts and translate them into an efficiency account. Most 
of these criticisms implicitly assume smart contracts on public blockchains. We will therefore, in a 
second step, show that these criticisms are less justified when using smart contracts on permissioned 
systems. Lastly, we will provide arguments showing the advantages of smart contracts over traditional 
contracts that existing literature does not take sufficiently into account. 
Contract law provides several ex-post correction mechanisms referred to as mandatory rules, to prevent 
that parties are bound by agreements that are detrimental to themselves and to society. They curtail the 
basic principle of freedom of contract to promote other overriding values. 
Courts, for example, will not enforce contracts for which there was no genuine meeting of the minds, as 
in the case of mistake, fraud, duress or necessity. These contract law doctrines128 provide excuses for 
non-performance and defenses against formation. From an economic perspective, they cure market 
failures resulting from actions by market players that deviate from individual rationality (e.g. duress, 
necessity) or from asymmetric information (e.g. fraud, mistake).129 As smart contracts are self-enforcing, 
performance of the contract will occur even though from a legal perspective the contract is invalid.130 
Smart contracts thus lack the function provided by courts in the case of traditional contracts to adjust 
results ex post that were due to ex ante defects in the consent of the parties.131 
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Similarly, courts will not enforce a contract against a party that lacked capacity at the moment of contract 
formation, as for example against a minor or against an intoxicated person. The economic function of 
capacity is again to cure market failures resulting from deviations from individual rationality.132 As in 
the case of other formation defenses and excuses, smart contracts cannot account for whether a party 
had the capacity to enter into a contract, unless an identity verification system is in place in case of a 
permissioned blockchain. Still, it would be difficult to imagine how a smart contract could identify 
temporary incapacity as, for example, in the case of intoxication. 
Capacity reveals a further problem with smart contracts: the identity of the party entering into a contract 
can be of fundamental legal importance. On a blockchain on which keys cannot be linked to a particular 
natural person (because of pseudonymity or anonymity), as in the case of a public blockchain, it is 
difficult to establish the identity of the person using the key in a particular smart contract transaction.133 
Consequently, it is also difficult or impossible to establish whether the party had legal capacity to enter 
into the contract. 
Certain protections awarded under contract law to consumers have also been mentioned as a challenge 
for smart contracts.134 Consumer protection measures in contract law remedy market failures of a 
monopoly type and of asymmetric information between consumers and businesses.135 It is claimed that 
these protection measures could only be implemented with great difficulty by smart contracts.136 
Lastly, courts will not enforce contracts that have an illegal purpose. A smart contract programmed to 
enforce a price-fixing cartel,137 or to transfer illegal drugs or arms, imposes externalities on society. 
While enforcement agencies would take action in such cases, they would powerless in trying to stop the 
execution of the smart contract, due to its self-enforcing nature.138 The example of The DAO is a vivid 
example of what happens when the blockchain and smart contract system do not provide safeguards 
against illegality due to a weakness in the smart contracts’ code.139 
Smart Contracts that would have any of the flaws outlined above would thus cease to be contracts in a 
legal sense, and they would be undesirable from an economic efficiency perspective. Nonetheless, as 
they would be enshrined in autonomous code on the blockchain, they would be enforced automatically. 
Smart contracts thus bear the potential of establishing a parallel system to the state-provided legal system 
that is governed by its own rules.140 
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As technology stands at the moment it seems indeed difficult to implement any functions in a smart 
contract that would emulate contractual doctrines such as mistake, fraud, duress, necessity or capacity.141 
Filippi and Wright argue the same in relation to consumer protection provisions.142  
Nonetheless, consumer protection, for example could actually be enhanced in different ways by smart 
contracts. In contrast to critics, Fairfield emphasises that the gains in consumer protection through use 
of smart contracts would be superior to consumer protection provided by courts.143 According to him, 
automated agents programmed through smart contracts could search the internet for a given product sold 
in combination with the most beneficial standard-form clauses for the consumer and purchase it by being 
able to release funds from a connected bitcoin wallet.144 This would enhance two goals of consumer 
protection: Firstly, the consumer could shop for the best possible contract terms at low cost. Secondly, 
the payment in bitcoin would limit the amount of payment data that the consumer has to reveal in the 
transaction. It would thus further consumers’ control over the use of their personal data. 
Permissioned blockchain: Another more general point could be made in relation to traditional ex-post 
correction mechanisms regarding to contract formation and validity (mistake, fraud, duress, necessity). 
If parties chose to implement their smart contracts on a permissioned blockchain, it could be possible to 
reach a consensus to reverse smart contract transactions on a permissioned blockchain that have been 
made on the basis of a mistake or other flaw. As the identities of parties to smart contracts would be 
known (i.e. there would be no anonymity), this would also make the implementation of a corresponding 
court order possible. Furthermore, users’ identities could be verified when registering with the system, 
curing some problems with capacity. 
Public blockchain: In relation to traditional ex-post mechanism, there are already some technologies 
in place that can be used to have a safeguard protecting against unwanted self-execution of a smart 
contract. Multi-signature ('multisig') verification technology allows for halting the execution of a smart 
contract until several parties have signed the transaction with their private keys. These can include not 
only the parties to the smart contract, but also an external third party (a so-called arbiter).145 In a goods 
sale, for example, a multisig smart contract could e.g. require the signature of two of three parties. If the 
buyer is satisfied with the good, both buyer and seller would sign and the smart contract would execute. 
If the buyer and/or seller were mistaken as to the good to be sold, the buyer could refuse to sign after 
having received the wrong good. If the seller nonetheless signs, the signature of the arbiter would then 
determine whether the execution of the smart contract goes through or not. 
In relation to possible illegal transactions through smart contracts, the openness of public blockchains 
could be an advantage. As all blocks would be visible to everyone, and so would be the content of blocks 
that contain an illegal transaction. The fact that an illegal transaction would be visible to everyone could 
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already provide a deterrent for entering into illegal smart contracts.146 While anonymity or pseudonymity 
of users could pose a challenge for law enforcement, experience with Bitcoin shows that there are 
mechanisms to identify a person behind a public key.147 
3.5. Efficient breach 
A defining feature of smart contracts is that they are self-enforcing, which gives a different meaning to 
breach of contract. While the self-enforcing nature guarantees the performance of the contract and 
eliminates risks from non-performance in a great number of cases, it also makes it more difficult to 
breach a contract when it would be efficient. In common law countries, contractual breaches in cases 
where the cost of performing the contract turn out to outweigh its value are viewed as a common practice 
and are deemed acceptable (even if wrongful nevertheless)148 as long as the breaching party pays 
damages to the victim.149  
In a way, traditional contract law in common law provides an avenue for parties to walk away from their 
contractual promises, and take advantage of more beneficial alternatives to promise-keeping, as long as 
the victim of the breach is fully compensated for the costs of non-performance by the breacher through 
the payment of damages. The result is Pareto efficient: while the party in breach is better off by taking 
advantage of a better deal than the contract, the victim of the breach is not worse off. The theory of 
efficient breach has been built around this claim.150 
The fact that due to automatic enforcement smart contracts seem to lock parties into performance, 
together with the impossibility of being able to renegotiate a smart contract, have been pointed out as a 
problematic feature of smart contracts.151 From the point of view of efficiency, the result of automatic 
enforcement of smart contracts could lead to excessive enforcement of contracts, which could in turn 
lead to overall efficiency losses. This claim is similar to the ones raised against the remedy of specific 
performance for breach of contract.152 While the arguments for inefficiency of specific performance 
have been countered by the argument that specific performance as a remedy could incentivize efficient 
renegotiation of contracts,153 this argument does not work in the case of smart contracts. Since they are 
automatically enforced once placed on the blockchain, automated performance would not allow for 
renegotiation to achieve more efficient outcomes.154   
The issue of how to facilitate efficient breaches could possibly be addressed by features already present 
in smart contracts. It could be imagined that parties could include an option in their contract, which 
allows for breach upon the condition that damages are paid. This would be akin to a liquidated damages 
clause. For there to be a situation of efficient breach, the value of performing a contract plus expectation 
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damages to the victim must be lower than the opportunity costs to enter into another, superior contract. 
Whether such a situation exists could be verified by including a reference to oracles in the smart contract. 
Oracles are external to a blockchain system and provide information as to whether certain conditions 
have been met.155 They support the execution (or non-execution) of a smart contract by providing the 
signature that a certain state in the outside world required for the execution has been met. Oracles could 
for example provide information on stock prices or any other data about the world that is relevant for 
the execution of a smart contract.  
A drawback of oracles is that they could make smart contracts more vulnerable to tampering due to the 
possibility of manipulating outside sources providing relevant information. This risk could be mitigated, 
however, by requiring the signature of several independent oracles that provide information about the 
same state of the outside world.156 The gains of not being bound by a very disadvantageous smart 
contract in light of new, more beneficial alternatives would likely outweigh the possible costs of facing 
a corrupted oracle. 
3.6. Relational contracts and trustless reliability 
Cooperation in contracting can also be achieved without relying on formal contract law. In  his work 
'Lawlessness and Economics', the economist Avinash Dixit discusses, for example, how cooperation in 
a community of traders can be sustained in an environment of 'lawlessness', where there is no state-
provided contract law or state-provided enforcement mechanism to enable cooperation (and avoid 
opportunism) in exchange transactions.157 He provides a game theoretical model showing to what extent 
cooperation can take place in a community of traders without relying on formal contract law, and which 
parameters determine whether cooperation will be sustainable or break down.  
While Dixit shows how cooperation can be obtained in the complete absence of formal, state-provided 
contract law, the entire body of work on relational theory of contract shows that contracting parties often 
do not rely on formal contract law even if available to them.158 Family ties, reciprocity in established 
long-term relationships, uncodified business customs or even altruism can act as incentives for actors to 
keep their promises. When creating exchange relationships, modifying agreements, or when settling 
disputes, contracting parties often prefer to rely on social mechanisms outside formal contract law to 
ensure continued cooperation. The shorthand used by economists for such relational contracts is to 
define them as 'informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships'.159 
In both Dixit’s 'lawless' contracting environment and a relational contracting environment,160 there exist 
social mechanisms that function as alternatives to formal contract law, which rely mainly on trust, 
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honesty or reputation among the parties of a business community to enforce agreements. Under certain 
conditions, these can prove to be more efficient than relying on formal contract law.161 
When it comes to assessing smart contracts from a relational perspective, Levy (2017) criticizes that 
they cannot replicate the design of relational context in which contracts are usually concluded.162 She 
argues, in line with relational contract theory, that contracts are social tools and are not always meant to 
be enforced according to their letter. At times parties include deliberately unenforceable and vague terms 
in their contracts which are only meant as rough guidelines for behavior. The inclusion of vague terms 
that give no clear 'if..then' instructions are very difficult to translate into the language of code as required 
by smart contracts. Furthermore, parties sometimes decide willfully not to enforce a contract that has 
been breached by the other party in order to ensure a continued relationship. Automated enforcement of 
smart contracts might foreclose such relational uses of contract.  
From our point of view, smart contracts nonetheless present an improvement for contracts which would 
be concluded in an environment with no particular pre-existing social context in which they are 
embedded. In an environment where there are no pre-existing business or family ties and no common 
cultural references, there is likely to be no trust coupled with no fear of losing reputation that would 
induce cooperation. In such a setting, contract law would initially appear to be the only available option 
to ensure cooperation in economic exchange. However, smart contracts could actually provide a new 
improved alternative to formal contract law in such a setting. Parties can avoid traditional contract law 
doctrines as tools for sustaining efficient exchange (or mandatory for other reasons) and favor smart 
contracts because of the combination of unique features of these contracts which help to avoid efficiency 
losses and increase reliability. These features include automatic enforcement, decentralization and 
crypto-proof character. 
Thanks to being uniform in nature (independent of the particularities of different jurisdictions), smart 
contracts can facilitate trade across the world, and across different societal embeddings, which would 
not take place but for the no-trust mechanism provided by blockchain technology.163 Even more, in such 
a global setting, not even contract law could ensure the enforcement of agreements, due to limited 
jurisdictional reach in many cases. In this case smart contracts could prove to be the only instrument 
available to ensure cooperation thanks to automatic enforcement.  
When discussing the no-trust environment, we mentioned briefly that arguably on blockchain, trust 
between parties (peer-to-peer) or trust in a central authority (Leviathan) is not necessary for economic 
exchange to occur. Let us think deeper, how blockchain’s 'trustless trust' could offer a new trust 
environment for trade and think of public blockchain as the paradigmatic example of blockchain in 
particular. On public blockchains, parties can engage in contracting and economic exchange while being 
completely anonymous to each other. When parties trust the technology, they can act on their normal 
incentives to engage in economic exchange. 
In a recent report, the UK Government Scientific Adviser has suggested that '[i]n cyberspace, trust is 
based on two key requirements: prove to me that you are who you say you are (authentication); and 
prove to me that you have the permissions necessary to do what you ask (authorisation). In return, I will 
prove to you that I am trustworthy by delivering services or products to you in a secure, efficient and 
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reliable fashion.'164 'Authentication does not require that I know your identity but it does require that you 
provide me a token that is inextricably linked to your identity, for example the pin number associated 
with a credit or debit card, or a fingerprint allied to a biometric passport or other document.'165 As Anne 
Veerpalu has noted in reference to this, privacy is protected in distributed ledger technology far beyond 
current regulation of transactions as 'Satoshi eliminated the need to know the true identities of those 
others in order to interact with them'166 and 'everything is based on crypto proof instead of trust'167 as we 
have known it so far.168 
Smart contracts on public blockchains could be reliable contracting devices for no-trust environments, 
because parties can rely on the underlying technology without having to trust the other party, a central 
authority or the agents in blockchain’s consensus mechanism. Trusting the other contracting party is not 
necessary, because the technology will take care that the other party performs her obligation. Trusting a 
central authority is not necessary, because public blockchains escape any central control due to their 
decentralized nature. And trusting the nodes involved in the proofing mechanism is not necessary, 
because servicing nodes will only benefit from approving transactions on the blockchain if they comply 
with the rules of the system.  
Additionally, we should take account of two other general features of public blockchains that enhance 
trust in the technology - the transparency of transactions and the ability to sustain the integrity of data. 
Since the first has been explained above,169 let us focus on the second. Integrity of data in this context 
is the maintenance of the consistency, accuracy, and trustworthiness of data over its entire life cycle. 
Blockchain-based applications direct us to thinking of the integrity of data and the ability to monitor 
and control the use of our data as further guarantees for reliability of the technology. The integrity of 
data together with the ability to monitor and control the use of our data, provides a strong guarantee for 
the security of our data, our trust towards the other parties to contracts, as well as to the certainty about 
performance. The traces that any operation on blockchain leaves (the 'logs' created on blockchain) make 
it possible to monitor activities related to us or hold other account holders accountable if necessary. 
Some have considered it one of the main advantages of the blockchain technology that it provides 
foundations for consistent, public and shared transactions thereby using data integrity for guaranteeing 
higher data security than previous technologies.170  
In such a manner, trust between parties would not be replaced by but supported by the trust in the 
technology powering smart contracts.171 We call it the 'trustless reliability' of smart contracts. It is built 
on the automatic enforcement, decentralization, proofing mechanism underlying smart contracts, which 
provide the transparency and integrity of data. These important properties help us to put smart contracts 
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forward as a response to the situations where the lack of social context, including lack of trust between 
parties or low level of certainty in terms of performance, might inhibit contracting. 
4. Conclusion 
The regulatory challenges facing smart contracts based on public blockchains and smart contracts based 
on permissioned blockchains are decidedly different. We compared these two different types of smart 
contracts based on four different features (the identifiability of persons transacting on blockchain, the 
selection of nodes and size of network together with the related expenses, the particularities of consensus 
mechanism, and the openness of the content of the blocks) ultimately focusing on anonymity for the 
following reasons. 
On public blockchains, the users are able to remain anonymous to a significant extent. When you have 
anonymity you have a no-trust environment for contracting. Until recently, complete anonymity 
between parties would provide for the paradigm set of circumstances where we would imagine needing 
contract law. This is because due to the anonymity the contract was not embedded in any social context 
that could work as an alternative enforcement mechanism to ensure that all parties cooperate. In order 
to contract in no-trust environments, there is a need for an enforcement mechanism which provides 
sufficient safeguards for contracting.  
Smart contracts seem to be able to function in contracting environments where parties could meet in 
complete anonymity. Interestingly, they can provide sufficient safeguards for enforcement. However, 
there is an important choice to be made in this regard. The safeguards could be either invasive regarding 
anonymity (e.g. direct to using permissioned blockchains) or they could be incorporated into the code 
of smart contracts to avoid certain inefficiencies arising from their automated execution (thus remaining 
on the public blockchain where the anonymity is defining feature). We have argued in this paper that 
the latter is a better alternative. It is applicable to all blockchains and provides grounds for developing 
smart contracts which are compatible with the central features of broadly accessible public blockchain 
- its anonymity and transparency. The latter are also some of the most important guarantees for the 
trustworthiness and security of data next to confidentiality. 
As such, smart contracts offer a new mode of contracting governance, a vehicle for contracting while 
not relying on formal contract law, and an alternative mechanism for ensuring cooperative outcomes in 
transactions between two or more parties. 
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